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Unemployment, Growth, and Trade
Unions
HENRI L.F. DE GROOT
ABSTRACT    This paper develops a two-sector endogenous growth model with a dual
labor market caused by the operation of trade unions. Trade unions strive for the
extraction of rents from the growth generating imperfectly competitive primary sector.
This union behavior results in a non-competitive wage differential between the primary
and secondary (perfectly competitive) sector. How the relationship between growth and
unemployment depends on the institutional details of the labor market is analyzed. In
general, growth and unemployment are intimately related for two reasons. Unemploy-
ment affects the scale of operation of the economy and thereby the growth rate. Growth
affects inter-temporal decisions of workers about where to allocate on the labor market
once they are laid off, and thereby it affects equilibrium unemployment.
Introduction
rade unions aim to further the interest of workers in a broad sense. It is
generally acknowledged that this behavior tends to increase real wage
costs and unemployment. Much less is known about the effects of trade unions
on other variables like economic growth. With the advent of the endogenous
growth theory, these effects have gained interest. Where traditionally growth
theory and unemployment theory have developed among separate lines, recent
efforts have been made to study the inter-relatedness between growth and labor
market institutions, among which trade unions feature prominently. This paper,
will try to add to the understanding of how growth and unemployment are
related, and how this relationship is shaped by labor market institutions.
The model that will be developed can best be characterized as a two-sector
endogenous growth model, characterized by a non-Walrasian labor market.
Endogenous growth results from the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge,
and the operation of trade unions results in a dual labor market with non-
competitive wage differentials.  Unemployment arises due to distortions in the
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supply of labor, caused by the non-competitive wage differential. Besides the
presence of trade unions, an important role is played in the model by other
institutional factors that characterize labor market performance. More
specifically the effects of linking unemployment benefits to previous earnings
will be studied in a model with a dual labor market. This way of modeling is
strongly inspired by recent empirical literature on technology and employment.
In the OECD Jobs Study (1994), the relationship between high-tech and high-
wage sectors is explored. It is argued that production of manufacturing goods
increasingly takes place in conditions of imperfect competition. Imperfect
competition results in rents that are often shared with workers, and in wages that
differ considerably between sectors, even after controlling for age, education,
occupation, and gender. These wage premiums are stable over time and their
structure is roughly similar across countries (e.g. Krueger and Summers 1988).
An important reason for firms to engage in rent sharing may be the presence of
trade unions. The potential consequences of all this are indicated by the OECD
(1994, part II, section IV) when it states that “The duality of the labor market
under these considerations also introduces frictions in the workings of the
market mechanism: the unemployed may prolong their job search in the hope of
getting into the ‘high-wage’ firms and sectors, and displaced workers from the
‘high-wage’ firms and sectors may have very high replacement rates and hence
reservation wages when compensations are based on previous earning.” The
goal of this paper is to study how the previously described behavior of trade
unions affects growth and equilibrium unemployment, and to explain for what
(theoretical) reasons growth and unemployment are intimately linked to each
other. In particular, the importance of scale effects and inter-temporal trade-offs
made by workers in yielding a two-sided causal relationship between growth
and unemployment will be emphasized.
Previous papers have already studied the relationship between growth,
unemployment and trade unions.1 Bean and Crafts (1995) show how the
operation of trade unions may result in lower investments and growth. Firms
invest in order to increase their profits. An essential characteristic of many types
of investments is that they have a sunk-cost character. This puts trade unions,
once investments have been made, in a relatively strong bargaining position.
Due to the sunk-cost character of the investment, the trade union can extract part
of the rent that is associated with the investment. Aware of this, firms will invest
less (under the assumption that firms and unions cannot sign a complete contract
in which the division of rents resulting from investments to be made in the
future is agreed upon). The problem described here is known as the ‘hold-up
problem’ and was formally modeled by Grout (1984). Bean and Crafts integrate
this insight into a model of endogenous growth in which R&D is aimed at
developing new products. The reward for investments resulting in the
development of new products is a monopoly profit to be earned by the inventor
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of the new product. In the presence of trade unions, some of the profits are
extracted by the trade unions, which reduces the incentive to develop new
products and thereby reduces growth. The central idea in Daveri and Tabellini
(1997) is that the presence of unions results in high real wage costs. They have
developed an overlapping generations model in which both labor and capital are
used as inputs in the production process. Endogenous growth results from an
external effect related to the accumulation of physical capital. Wages are set by
monopolistic trade unions. High wage costs push firms to a more capital-
intensive production process, and will result in lower employment and a
reduction in the marginal product of capital. This last effect induces a fall in
savings and growth. Growth and unemployment are thus negatively correlated in
both cross-sections and time series, where the correlation stems from differences
in wage costs between countries or time-periods.2
This model deviates from the before mentioned models in that it models
growth and unemployment in the context of a dual labor market and focus on
distortions in the supply of labor causing equilibrium unemployment (instead of
demand distortions resulting from excessive wage costs). The process is as
follows. The consumer and producer behavior in this model is first briefly
presented. Subsequently, the labor-market block of the model is discussed, with
an emphasis on union behavior. Next, the general equilibrium of the model is
presented. The results will be derived on the relationship between growth and
unemployment and the effects of several labor market institutions on growth and
unemployment will be studied. In turn, the model is extended in order to stress
other aspects of labor market institutions that might affect growth, unemploy-
ment and their inter-relatedness. The focus will be on the effects of linking
unemployment benefits to previous earnings. Besides being interesting from a
policy point of view, this extension allows a study of to what extent the
relationship between growth and unemployment is sensitive to the particular
way of modeling the labor market. Finally, the empirical evidence on the
relationship between growth, unemployment and trade unions is discussed.
Consumer and Producer Behavior
A two-sector economy with endogenous growth and a non-Walrasian labor
market is modeled.  Producer and consumer behavior is briefly discussed in this
section.  In the model that is developed, there is only one homogeneous factor of
production, namely labor. The secondary sector of the economy operates under
perfect competition and produces a homogeneous good (labeled Y). Firms in the
primary sector, produce unique brands of a high-tech product (labeled xi). There
are N firms in this sector, indexed i=1,…, N that operate under monopolistic
competition (N is assumed to be sufficiently large), and consequently earn a
non-competitive rent. Trade unions struggle on behalf of the workers with the
firm on the division of this rent among the firm and the workers. This
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negotiation yields the unions part of the non-competitive rent, which they
distribute among the workers in the primary sector. These workers thus receive a
non-competitive rent, which makes working in the primary sector more
attractive than working in the competitive secondary sector. Under some
assumptions that will be explored in this paper, this generates ‘wait unemploy-
ment’, i.e., workers queuing for high-tech high-paid jobs.3 Growth results from
high-tech firms performing research and development (R&D), which results in
improved production technologies with which high-tech goods are being
produced. Consumers maximize inter-temporal utility, where utility is derived
from consumption of the goods produced in the economy.
Consumer behavior is summarized in Table 1. Where it leads to no
confusion, time indices have been omitted. Consumers maximize their inter-
temporal utility (C.1), where C is the macroeconomic consumption index with
the corresponding price index Pc , θ is the subjective discount rate, and I is total
income. Utility is derived from consumption of traditional and high-tech goods
(C.2), where X is a composite of high-tech goods with corresponding price index
PX , and Y is the traditional good with corresponding price PY . Finally,
consumers have a love for variety of high-tech goods, indicated by (C.3).
Varieties of high-tech goods are imperfect substitutes, the elasticity of
substitution being measured by ε.  In optimizing their behavior, consumers
decide where to allocate on the labor market in the first step in order to
maximize the present discounted value of all future consumption streams. The
next section will return to this step of optimization where the labor market of the
model will be discussed.  From the second step of the optimization procedure a
spending rule results, showing that a fraction (1-σ) of consumption expenditures
is spent on traditional goods (equation 1), while a fraction σ is spent on high-
tech goods. In the third step, consumers decide how much to buy of each variety
of the high-tech goods resulting in the demand function for a high-tech good of
variety i (equation 3). Finally, a macroeconomic price index (equation 2), and a
price index of high-tech goods (equation 4) are derived.
Producer behavior is summarized in Table 2. Producers in the secondary
sector operate under perfect competition and produce a homogeneous good with
unitary labor productivity (equations 5 and 6), using labor LY at a cost wY .  Firms
in the primary sector maximize profits (P.1), subject to the production function
of high-tech goods (equation 7), the allocation rule for research labor (equation
8), and the demand function for the brand of the variety it produces (equation 3).
Labor productivity is represented by h, labor input for productive purposes by
Lx, and R&D labor by Lr. It is assumed that R&D input is determined on the
basis of some rule of thumb according to which firms employ a fixed fraction β
of their direct production input for R&D purposes (see de Groot 1998 for
extensions). Optimization yields mark-up pricing (equation 10). The mark-up
over unit wage costs ([1+β]wT/h) increases as the elasticity of substitution
between any pair of high-tech goods decreases.
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TABLE 2. PRODUCER BEHAVIOR
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Note: a dot over a variable represents a derivative with respect to time.
74 GROWTH AND CHANGE, WINTER 2001
The Labor Market of the Model
In this section, the modeling of the labor-market block of the model will be
presented and discussed. First union behavior is discussed as well as under what
conditions union behavior will result in a non-competitive wage-differential.
Next, is the determination of equilibrium unemployment in a dual labor market.
Union behavior and non-competitive wage differentials. It is assumed that a
trade union is operating in each monopolistically competitive high-tech firm.
The union and the firm play a game on the division of rents generated by the
production of the differentiated high-tech good. The objective of the union is to
extract as much of the rents generated in the high-tech firm as possible.4
In pursuing rent maximization, the union has to outweigh the positive effect
of wage increases with the negative labor-demand effect, induced by the lower
product demand following a price (wage) increase. The firm on the other hand
wants as low a wage as possible (in order to keep as much of the rents as
possible). The ultimate outcome of this ‘struggle for rents’ is determined on the
basis of negotiations between the union and the firm. The bargain between the
firm and the union is modeled as
This is the so-called Nash bargain, or ‘right to manage’ approach to bargaining
between trade unions and firms. The parameter γ(≥0) reflects the relative
bargaining power of the firm, O reflects the alternative or outside wage for high-
tech workers (the firm’s profits in case no agreement is reached are assumed to
be zero), and λ measures the extent to which employment effects of the wage
bargain are taken into account by the unions. Highly individualistic bargaining
can be associated with a low λ, and collective bargaining with a high λ. In the
special case where λ=1, unions are after maximization of the wage bill (over the
alternative). An important point to mention is that the union and the firm do not
bargain over employment levels, as is assumed in efficient bargaining models
(e.g. McDonald and Solow 1985). The reasons for not using an efficient
bargaining approach are twofold. First, the efficient bargaining approach is
unrealistic from an empirical point of view, as it does not correspond to the
observation that employment is usually set unilaterally (e.g. Oswald 1987; Clark
and Oswald 1989). Secondly, an efficient bargaining model is incentive
incompatible as a firm always has an incentive to renege on the bargained
outcome once the bargain has been settled by choosing labor demand on the
demand curve (Oswald 1985).
The maximand in the Nash bargain depends crucially on three factors. The
first is the relative bargaining power of the parties engaged in the bargain (λ).
This relative power depends on the eagerness with which the firm wants to reach
an agreement (relative to the union's eagerness). The second factor is the union's
objective in the bargain which equals (wTi–O)[(1+β)Lxi]λ. The third term
represents the profits of the firm.
Taking the derivative of the Nash-maximand w.r.t. the wage rate yields the
first-order condition for a maximum
).1(where,)]1()[(max i βπλ +−=+−=Ω xiTiixixiTii
w
LwxpβLOw
T
GROWTH AND UNEMPLOYMENT 75
,=
w
EOw+
w
E
EOw+E=
w Ti
i
iiTii
Ti
i
iTiii
Ti
i 0)()( 11
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
−
∂
Ω∂
−
−
πγππλπ γλγλγλ
where Ei represents total employment per firm ([1+β]Lxi). Using the envelope
theorem (∂πi/∂wTi = -[1+β]Lxi), and
,
w
L
=
w
L
+=
w
E
Ti
xi
Ti
xi
Ti
i εββ )1()1( +−
∂
∂
∂
∂
which can be derived using the demand function for a good of variety i, leaves
us, upon combination with the first-order condition, with
.
+
=
w
Ow
Ti
Ti
)1(
1
−
−
εγλε
Using this mark-up of the wage rate over the alternative wage, the non-
competitive wage differential can now be characterized. In the remainder of this
paper the alternative wage will be assumed to be equal to the wage in the
secondary sector.5 Then, assuming symmetry so that the firm indices can be
skipped, the relative wage (ω) is derived as
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Thus it can be seen that a non-competitive wage differential arises due to the
operation of trade unions. This wage differential is smaller, the higher the
relative bargaining power of the firm. This is intuitively clear, as the firm has no
interest in paying high wages. An increase in the elasticity of demand of the
high-tech product will decrease the wage differential. The reason for this is that
as competition between high-tech firms becomes tougher, the union is hurt more
in terms of a loss in employment when it increases its wages. This leads to more
modest wage claims by the union. When there is perfect substitution between
high-tech goods (ε→∞), the non-competitive wage differential disappears. This
illustrates the argument that product market competition is a way to eliminate
the adverse effects of unions (e.g. Nickell and Layard 1997). Finally, the degree
of coordination plays a role in determining the wage differential. The larger the
degree of coordination (λ large), the smaller the non-competitive wage
differential. With completely collective bargaining (λ → ∞), there will be no
non-competitive wage differential left (ω = 1).
6
Equilibrium unemployment in a dual labor market.  An essential
characteristic of the model described so far is its dual labor market. The trade
union operating in the primary sector leads to a non-competitive rent (ω > 1).
There are various reasons why, resulting from this non-competitive element in
the labor market, equilibrium unemployment can result. Two of them will be
discussed.
The first is, building on the classical literature on dual labor markets, that it
may be advantageous for people who are not employed in the primary sector to
become unemployed instead of accepting a job in the secondary sector (e.g.
76 GROWTH AND CHANGE, WINTER 2001
Layered et al. 1991, Ch. 1). This may hold even though benefit payments
7
, bwY,
are lower than wages in the secondary sector as unemployed can have a higher
probability of (re-)entering the primary sector. Reasons can be that they have
more time to search for jobs, or that firms in the primary sector prefer
unemployed people over workers from the secondary sector because, for
example, secondary-sector workers get ‘negative general training’ (cf. Doeringer
and Piore 1971). Also, being in a secondary-sector job may be a bad signal (e.g.
McCormick 1990). Persons having accepted a secondary-sector job may be
considered as having a high turnover risk. Anyhow, the assumption that
unemployed people are more easily matched with high-wage jobs than are
workers in the secondary sector is often used as a simple and useful working
hypothesis in the literature on unemployment in dual labor markets (e.g. Bulow
and Summers 1986; Burda 1988; Calvo 1978; Harris and Todaro 1970;
McCormick 1990; Taubman and Wachter 1986).
Secondly, benefits may be so high that they (at least for some time) exceed
wages in the secondary sector.
8
 This may be caused by an institutional design
according to which benefit payments are linked to previous earnings. Even
though it may be the case that unemployed people are relatively badly matched
with high-wage jobs, it will be attractive for some people to become
unemployed and receive the high unemployment benefit. This issue will be
addressed later in the paper.
The remainder of this section will discuss how equilibrium unemployment
results, making the assumption that unemployed people are relatively efficiently
matched with high-paid jobs (compared to workers employed in the secondary
sector). The following assumptions are made. At each instant of time there are
lay-offs in the primary sector. At an exogenous rate δ jobs in the primary sector
fall free. For simplicity, and without loss of generality, it is assumed that there
are no lay-offs in the secondary sector. In principle, every worker would like to
be employed in the primary sector since this yields him the largest utility (see
equation C.1). The number of jobs in this sector is, however, restricted due to
the operation of goods-market equilibrium (see equation 1). Taking this into
account, a laid-off worker from the primary sector faces two options. He can
either allocate himself to a job in the secondary sector, or he can allocate himself
to the pool of unemployed. In determining his optimal strategy, the worker has
to take the following two considerations into account: (i) the earnings rate when
being unemployed is lower than the wage in the secondary sector (b<1), and (ii)
the matching efficiency of unemployed people is larger than the one of those
employed in the secondary sector (α < 1, where α is the relative efficiency with
which secondary-sector workers are matched with high-paid jobs, compared to
unemployed people). The process of outweighing the two opportunities that
laid-off high-tech workers are facing finally results in an endogenously
determined probability η of going to one of the two states (i.e., the state of
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( ) ,VVq+w=DV YTYY −α (12)
where DVY is the valuation put on having a job in the traditional sector (compare
Pissarides 1990). This valuation equals the return on the traditional sector job.
Similarly derived is
( ) ,VVq+bw=DV UTYU − (13)
and
( ) ( ) .VV+VV+w=DV TUTYTT −−− )1( ηδδη (14)
For equilibrium to hold, it is required throughout that the value of a job in the
traditional sector equals the value of being unemployed
.VV UY = (15)
In addition, two flow-equilibrium conditions are imposed, guaranteeing a
constant allocation of labor over the three states
10
,qL=L YT αδη (16)
and
.qU=LT)1( ηδ − (17)
Employment in the high-tech sector equals
.LN=LLN=L xrxT )1()( β++ (18)
Finally, a stock-equilibrium condition must be imposed:
,ULL=L YT ++ (19)
so total (exogenous) labor supply L is either employed in one of the two sectors
or unemployed. This labor-market block of the model yields a relationship
between the unemployment rate and the number of high-tech workers as a
function of the relative wage differential (ω), the unemployment benefit (b), the
relative matching efficiency of secondary-sector workers (α), and the discount
rate (D).
The resulting unemployment in this model has to be thought of as wait
unemployment. That is, part of the labor force is deliberately queuing for the
high-paid jobs. In the dual structure in this model it is impossible to call this
type of unemployment either voluntary or involuntary. It is voluntary in the
sense that the unemployed could, in principle, choose to be employed in the
secondary sector. They decide not to do so as this is not in their economic
interest. It is involuntary, however, as all the unemployed are willing to accept a
job in the primary sector, but are not offered such a job because of the rationing
that is going on in that sector.
Endogenous Growth and Equilibrium Unemployment
This section will discuss the equilibrium characteristics of the model just
described, then, some comparative statics of the model. More specifically, the
effects of changes in unemployment benefits (more generally, the generosity of
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the social security system), union’s bargaining power, relative efficiency of
matching unemployed with high-wage jobs, and changes in the discount rate
will be examined. The central questions will be whether there is a relationship
between growth and unemployment, which factors influence this relationship,
and whether the relationship is positive or negative.
Solution of the model  To solve for the model, start from the equations 12-
15, which form the partial labor market block of this model. Take the wage rate
in the traditional sector as numeraire (wY=1 so wT= ω). From these equations we
can solve for q. This yields
.
b
b+D
=q )1()1(
)1)((
ααω
δ
−−−
−
(20)
The wage differential has to be sufficiently large to guarantee positive flows on
the labor market (ω>(1-αb)/(1-α)). A smaller wage ratio would result in corner
solutions (no labor would be unemployed, and η would be equal to one; there
would only be flows between the primary and secondary sector). Using this
solution and the flow-conditions (Eq. 16 and 17) the following relationship
between unemployment and employment in the two sectors can be derived:
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Now substituting this equation along with the expression for goods-market
equilibrium (equation 1) and the expression for the size of the firm (equation 18)
into labor market equilibrium (equation 19), the solution for the size of the
production department (as an implicit function)
11  
is found:
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This equation yields the solution for the size of the production department (using
that g = ξβLx ).
The solution of the model is graphically depicted in Figure 2. In this figure,
three loci are depicted. The GG-locus represents equation 9, which has a slope
equal to 1/(βξ). The TT-locus represents equation 22. This equation gives us the
maximal amount of production labor that can be employed, taking into account
goods-market equilibrium and the fact that the effective supply of labor (L-U) is
endogenous. It is downward sloping since a higher growth rate implies a lower
discount rate, increasing the importance of future earnings and thus increasing
unemployment and reducing the effective labor supply. The equilibrium growth
rate is found at the intersection of the GG- and the TT-locus. Having determined
the equilibrium number of high-tech production workers, unemployment follows
from using the UU-locus which is derived from goods- and labor-market
equilibrium as U=L-N(1+β)Lx[1+εω(1-σ)/{(ε-1)σ}].12
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An increase in the generosity of the social security system (b) makes
becoming unemployed more attractive since the cost of waiting decreases. This
turns the TT-locus downwards. Hence, equilibrium unemployment will increase
and both the traditional and the high-tech sector will shrink. High technology
(high-tech) firms will become smaller in size and the growth rate will decrease.
This will make unemployment a less attractive option for laid-off workers, but
still unemployment will unambiguously increase.
13
  An increase in the wage
ratio resulting from an increase in the bargaining power of unions results in a
decrease of the size of high-tech firms (this follows from Figure 2 in which the
TT- and UU-loci turn downwards around their fixed points on the horizontal
axis). Growth accordingly will decrease, and the discount rate (D) will increase.
To determine the effects of a change in the union’s bargaining power or the
degree of centralization of the wage bargain on unemployment three effects
must be considered. First, an increase in the wage ratio makes becoming
unemployed and waiting for an (extra) highly paid job more attractive,
increasing unemployment. Secondly, it changes the composition of production
in favor of traditional goods (since they become relatively cheap). This results in
a smaller high-tech sector and fewer lay-offs, making unemployment a less
attractive option. Finally, the discount rate increases as the growth rate declines.
This decreases the attractiveness of becoming unemployed. Still, unemployment
is likely to increase when unions become more powerful (as has been derived
from extensive numerical simulations with the model). An increase in the
relative efficiency with which secondary-sector workers are matched with high-
tech jobs makes becoming unemployed less attractive and accordingly more
laid-off high-tech workers will opt for a job in the secondary sector. This
reduces unemployment. In addition, growth will increase following an improved
matching efficiency. The at first sight surprising conclusion that an improved
relative matching of unemployed people (α lower) results in lower growth and
increased unemployment is easily explained by noting that unemployment has
the character of wait-unemployment. What essentially happens if the relative
matching efficiency improves is that the costs of waiting for a high-paid job
decrease. Finally, an increase in the discount rate (θ) makes future high
payments and the associated large consumption streams less important for
workers. Consequently, relatively much laid-off workers will opt for a job in the
traditional sector if the discount rate is large. Unemployment will accordingly
decrease and both the high-tech and the traditional sector will become larger in
size. In addition, the growth rate will increase.
Although in all the comparative-static exercises that were considered so far,
growth and unemployment moved in opposite directions, this conclusion does
not hold in general. Depending on the underlying differences in economic
structure (either between countries or time episodes), we can find positive as
well as negative correlations between growth and unemployment. To illustrate
82 GROWTH AND CHANGE, WINTER 2001
this, consider the case of an increase in the equilibrium number of firms (which
may be considered as an increase in competition). In such a case, all high-tech
firms become smaller in size and growth decreases, while the high-tech sector
becomes larger. The traditional sector also becomes larger. The increase in the
discount rate that follows from the decreased growth rate makes becoming
unemployed and opting for a high future payment less attractive and unemploy-
ment decreases as well.
Extensions and Generalization of the Model
The central idea in this section is that the linkage of unemployment benefits
to previous earnings in the presence of a dual labor market can be an important
cause of equilibrium unemployment. More specifically, the linkage may be so
tight initially that benefits exceed the wages that are paid in the secondary
sector. Even if unemployed people will be less successful in being matched with
high-paid jobs than workers in the secondary sector, this may yield a rationale
for laid-off high-tech workers to become unemployed. A citation of the OECD
Jobs Study (1994) is instructive here: “The duality of the labor market ...
introduces frictions in the working of the market mechanism: the unemployed
may prolong their job search in the hope of getting into ‘high-wage’ firms and
sectors, and displaced workers from the ‘high-wage’ firms and sectors may have
very high replacement rates and hence reservation wages when compensations
are based on previous earnings.”
To model this idea, the modeling of the labor market as compared to the
previous section must be changed. This serves two goals. The first goal is to
show that the result that growth and unemployment are intimately related does
not hinge on the specific way in which the labor market is modeled. In
particular, the assumptions made previously that there are no lay-offs from the
traditional sector and that traditional sector workers are relatively poorly
matched with high-tech jobs are relaxed.  The second goal is to show that the
way the labor market is designed does affect the relationship between growth
and unemployment and that, depending on the institutional detail of the labor
market, some policies may affect growth and unemployment in different ways.
Consumer and producer behavior remain as described before (equations 1-
10). On the labor market four groups of people are now distinguished. There are
people employed in the primary and the secondary sector; there are high-status
unemployed people that have just been laid off from the high-tech sector
receiving a high benefit (which they can receive for one instant of time); and
there are low-status unemployed receiving a low social security benefit. People
in this last group became unemployed either because they were laid off from the
secondary sector or because they were not able to find a job when they belonged
to the pool of high-status unemployed. Stocks and flows are represented in
Figure 3.
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status unemployed are less easily matched with a job in the secondary sector
than high-status unemployed). These assumptions are not subject to the
objections one can have against the assumption that unemployed people are
more effectively matched with a well-paid job than workers in the secondary
sector. Furthermore, benefits for high-status unemployed (i.e., those laid off
from the high-tech sector that opt for unemployment) are assumed to be larger
than wages in the secondary sector and to only last for one period. This is due to
the tightness of the link between benefits (bwT) and high-tech wages (wT). When
a high-status unemployed person does not find a job in either the primary or the
secondary sector, (s)he will become low-status unemployed and receive an
(exogenously given) benefit f  that is smaller than wages in the secondary sector.
People that are laid off from the secondary sector immediately receive the
benefit  f .
To formalize the labor market equilibrium, four Bellman-equations are
formulated describing the valuation put on the four states that people can arrive
at (T and Y indicate the primary and secondary sector, respectively, while UL
and UH indicate the status of low- and high-status unemployment, respectively).
These value-functions look like
,VV+VV+w=DV TUHTTYTTT ))(1()( −−− ηδηδ (25)
,VV+VVq+w=DV YULYYTTYYY )()( −− δα (26)
.VVq+VV+f=DV ULTTLULYYLUL )()( −− αα (27)
and
.VVq+VV+f=DV ULTTLULYYLUL )()( −− αα (28)
For equilibrium to hold, it is required that the value of becoming transitionally
unemployed equal the value of acquiring a job in the traditional sector
.V=V YUH (29)
Flow equilibrium requires
,U+L+U=L+q HYHTTLYLYYTY αηδαδα )( (30)
LTLHYTYT qUqUqLL ααδ ++= (31)
and
,Uq+=L+Uq-- LTLYLYYHYH )()1( ααδα (32)
where UL and UH represent long-term and transitional unemployment,
respectively. Defining total unemployment as U=UH+UL , the model is completed
by adding equations 11, 18 and 19. The model can now be solved. Given the
complexity of the model, numerical simulations must be relied upon. However,
the relation of growth and unemployment in this specific model can be
unambiguously derived. As before, growth and unemployment are basically
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related for two reasons. The scale effect causes unemployment and growth to be
negatively related since an increase in unemployment results in smaller firms
and lower growth. An increase in the growth rate, however, now affects
unemployment negatively. The reason is that when growth increases, high
current payments become less critical in the decision where to allocate. As the
highest current payments are obtained when becoming unemployed (bwT>wY),
while the largest probability of regaining a job in the high-tech sector is
achieved when allocating towards the traditional sector, more people will opt for
a job in the traditional sector and unemployment will decrease. Growth and
unemployment are thus unambiguously negatively related.
Table 3 describes some comparative statics of the model, resulting from
changes in the unemployment benefit level (f), changes in the bargaining power
of trade unions (the qualitative changes are identical to those of a change in the
degree of coordination of wage bargaining), changes in the effectiveness with
which various groups are matched with high-tech jobs (α), and changes in the
discount rate (θ). The results are broadly in line with what was seen in the
simple version of this model and will therefore not extensively be discussed
again.
14
 The point where results differ is with respect to changes in the
subjective discount rate. Increases in the discount rate make, contrary to the
previous model, waiting as an unemployed more attractive.  Current wages
TABLE 3. COMPARATIVE STATICS OF THE EXTENDED MODEL.
Base f (+ 0.1 %) α (+0.1%) γ (+0.1%) θ (+ 10%)
Lx 0.598 0.569 - 0.602 + 0.602 + 0.581 -
LT 44.827 42.702 - 45.133 + 45.152 + 43.590 -
LY 49.310 46.972 - 49.647 + 49.664 + 47.949 -
UT 0.959 3.865 + 0.535 - 0.512 - 2.656 +
UL 4.905 6.461 + 4.685 - 4.672 - 5.804 +
 0.786 0.095 - 0.881 + 0.887 + 0.391 -
q 0.0746 0.0691 - 0.0753 + 0.0754 + 0.0714 -
g (in %)1.494 1.423 - 1.504 + 1.505 + 1.453 -
D 0.0200 0.0205 + 0.0200 - 0.0200 - 0.0232 +
Note: the base-line is based on the following parameter constellation: θ=0.029, γ=4, λ=1
(implying ω=1.1), δT=0.1, b=0.94, f=0.94, αTL=0.89, αTY=1.11, L=100, σ=0.6, β=0.25, ε=3,
N=60, ξ=0.1, αYL=0.5, αYH=0.6, δY=0.05. Signs in the table indicate the direction of change
when compared to the base-line.
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become more important in deciding where to allocate, and, since the highest
earnings are gathered (initially) when becoming unemployed, relatively more
people will opt for unemployment. This will make both the traditional and the
high-tech sector smaller in size and the growth rate will decrease accordingly.
This will further increase the discount rate and reinforce the inter-temporal
effects.
Some Empirical Evidence on Growth, Trade Unions and
Unemployment
Empirical studies that systematically test for the relationship between growth
and unemployment, controlling for all kinds of potentially important variables
that may shape this relationship like the presence of trade unions is scarce. A
recent study which considers the effects of labor market institutions on growth
and unemployment is Nickell and Layard (1997). It presents a rich data set on
labor market institutions. Furthermore, it presents regressions explaining growth
and unemployment from the data capturing labor market institutions, as well as
an extensive and critical review of the results obtained in empirical studies
explaining either growth or unemployment, and/or their inter-relatedness. The
labor market institutions that are considered are taxes on labor, laws and
regulations covering employees’ rights, trade unions and the structure of wage
bargaining, the social security system (in a broad sense), the system of education
and training, and barriers to regional labor mobility. Cross-section regressions
are presented in which unemployment (both short- and long-term)15 and
productivity growth are regressed on the measures capturing labor market
institutions. The data cover 20 OECD countries and two time periods (1983-
1988 and 1989-1994). In their regressions (which are mainly intended to give a
quick insight into the correlations between the data they have gathered), no other
conditioning variables were used other than those capturing labor market
institutions. The growth rate, for example, is not regressed on the unemployment
rate, the savings rate, population growth, and other variables that are known to
influence economic growth.16 Similarly, the unemployment rate is not regressed
on variables such as product market competition, the growth rate, and
productivity relative to the U.S. at the beginning of the time period. The results
obtained on the basis of these exercises are that high taxes, generous social
security systems, and strong unions that coordinate little with employers
increase unemployment. The correlations between growth and labor market
institutions are weak. Some weak evidence is found that employment protection
has a positive effect on growth, while total labor taxes and benefit duration have
a negative effect.
The effects of taxes on growth and unemployment were studied by Daveri
and Tabellini (1997). They argue that in the presence of trade unions, high taxes
are shifted onto higher (gross) labor costs and result in unemployment (see the
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Introduction). In addition, these high wage costs result in large capital-labor
ratios and thereby reduce the returns to investment and lower economic growth.
They empirically test their thesis that countries with high taxes are characterized
by low growth and high rates of unemployment. Their tests are based on a panel
of 14 OECD countries during the period 1965-1991 (which is divided into five
sub-periods of equal length). Their results are in line with the theoretical
predictions and reasonably robust both quantitatively and qualitatively with
respect to the employed estimation technique as well as the instruments used.
Correcting for differences in effective tax rates on capital and labor, they
conclude that growth of per capita GDP and unemployment as well as invest-
ments and unemployment are negatively correlated. Furthermore, the increase in
unemployment and the slowdown in growth can, to a large extent, be traced
back to increases in taxes on labor. More specifically, they argue that the rise of
9.4 percentage points in the rate of effective labor taxes experienced on average
in the European countries under consideration has resulted in a decline in the
growth rate of 0.5 percentage points a year, and in increase in unemployment of
about 4 percentage points.
Most of the literature on the effects of trade unions on investments takes the
theoretical literature on the hold-up problem as a starting point (see the
Introduction) and tests whether investments are lower in the presence of trade-
unions. An extensive survey of the literature investigating union effects on
productivity, profits, and growth is Addison and Hirsch (1989). They find
support in the literature for rent-seeking behavior of unions that lowers firms’
investments in physical capital, as well as in R&D and other risky activities.
This results in productivity growth being relatively low in unionized firms and
industries. Bean and Crafts (1995) have later confirmed these results on the
basis of a panel regression covering 137 industries and eight periods. The
independent variables they include are the growth rate of the capital stock,
concentration ratios, and the level of import penetration to capture the effects of
competition, and variables capturing the impact of industrial relations like union
recognition and the presence of multiple unions. The main conclusions they
reach are that the presence of unions significantly depresses total factor
productivity and that workplaces with multiple unions experience about 1
percentage point lower growth of total factor productivity than single union
workplaces. In cross-sectional studies on the effects of trade unions no
significant growth effects have been found to our knowledge.
Van Reenen (1996) looks at the relationship between labor market
institutions and growth from a totally different angle. Based on a panel of British
firms, he finds evidence for the importance of rent-sharing. In particular, he
finds robust evidence that innovating firms generally pay higher wages, while
rival innovations tend to depress their own wages. This evidence can be seen as
an indication that firms engage in rent-sharing in order to enhance productivity
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(growth). Theoretical models on efficiency wages can provide arguments for
this behavior. This study is instructive in that it reveals one of the serious
problems one is faced with in empirical research. High wages may be a resultant
of strong unions which depress investments in R&D and lower growth, while
high wages may also result from rent-sharing by fast-growing firms that were
successful in innovating. From an empirical point of view, discriminating
between the alternative theories is a formidable task. It can be concluded that the
empirical research performed so far on the relationship between growth and
unemployment and the way labor market institutions shape this relationship is
scarce. Testing theories is a difficult task given their subtle implications. Future
empirical research has to test in a more systematic way how growth and
unemployment are related, controlling for all kinds of variables, using improved
data sets on more disaggregated levels, and acknowledging the insights (to be)
gained by theoretical research in order to avoid testing without a sound
theoretical background.
Conclusions
The model that has been developed in this paper is characterized by the
endogenous determination of (i) economic growth, (ii) non-competitive wage
differentials and (iii) unemployment. A crucial role in this model is played by
trade unions that struggle with high-tech firms about the rents generated by
those firms. The outcome of this struggle was shown to be an important
determinant of equilibrium growth and unemployment. The model enables us to
address some elements of the pressing problems of unemployment and
economic growth in a single and coherent general-equilibrium framework.
The results described here should be useful for a better understanding of the
post World War II performance of European countries. In this author’s opinion,
the development of the generous welfare state (as represented by an increase in
f) is an important element in explaining this performance characterized by
increased unemployment and lower growth since the early 1970s. In this sense,
this paper can be seen as complementary to the paper by Daveri and Tabellini
(1997) who point at the importance of increased taxes on labor. The model also
implicitly suggests some reasons for the empirically established fact that
European countries have persistently stayed behind the United States in terms of
productivity levels (refer to de Groot and van Schaik 1997 for a two-country
model in which the focus is on the relative performance of the U.S. and Europe
in terms of productivity and unemployment). The relatively generous welfare
state that characterizes Europe in this view resulted in relatively high European
unemployment rates and an associated small growth-generating high-tech sector.
This may have had adverse consequences for the number of people working in
the R&D sector of the economy with the associated consequence of lagging
behind of Europe in terms of productivity performance.
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NOTES
1. For an extensive discussion of other studies on growth and unemployment we refer to
de Groot (1998).
2. A slightly modified version of Daveri and Tabellini's model can be found in Nickell
and Layard (1997). They conclude that the mechanism focused upon by Daveri and
Tabellini, which relies heavily on a strong impact of the interest rate (marginal product
of capital) on savings, is one which they do not expect to operate much in practice.
Still, they expect labour market institutions to be important and to affect long term
growth rates not via equilibrium unemployment but via effects on savings, human
capital accumulation, technological and managerial innovation, and the start-up rate of
new companies.
3. This way of modelling is inspired by a paper of McDonald and Solow (1985). They
show that in a dual labor market where only the primary sector of the labour market is
unionised and the secondary sector behaves competitively, a non-competitive wage
differential and equilibrium unemployment arises. The main focus of McDonald and
Solow (1985) is on the development of wages and employment over the business cycle.
Our focus is on the relation between growth and unemployment in the long run,
abstracting from issues related to the business cycle.
4. By making this choice, we abstain from several interesting issues related to the
operation of trade unions. For example, this choice of the objective function neglects
the apparent fact that unions care about the macroeconomic unemployment rate, the
income distribution, lay-off criteria, unemployment insurance, working conditions, and
their membership. For our aim, the simple way of modelling a union's preferences is,
however, sufficient. It captures the idea that we have in mind, namely that trade unions
are mainly after the extraction of economic rents, aimed at furthering the interest of
workers within the firm and resulting in a non-competitive wage differential.
5. It is important to recognise that unemployment in this model has the character of wait-
unemployment. This means that some people are deliberately queuing up in the pool of
unemployed in order to get a high-paid job with a relatively high probability. In
principle every laid-off high-tech worker could get the wage in the secondary sector,
and hence this is the relevant outside option for the trade union. The only reason not to
opt for this wage is that it may be in the (economic) interest of some people to become
unemployed.
6. In general, we can divide the parameter space in two regions. For λ>1-(ε-1)γ/ε the
wage-differential () is smaller than the mark-up (ε/[ε-1]). When either γ or λ goes to
infinity, the wage-differential converges to one. For λ<1-(ε-1) γ/ε, the wage-differential
() is larger than the mark-up, and forλ=1-(ε -1) γ/ε they are equal.
7. We assume for simplicity that benefits are paid out of non-distortionary lump-sum
taxes. The height of these benefits is exogenously given.
8. In addition, not considered here, there may be non-pecuniary benefits from being
unemployed (e.g., the consumption of leisure) yielding total utility from being
unemployed that is larger than utility from working in the secondary sector. More
specifically, we can assume that bw
Y
 represents the unemployment benefit plus the
value of leisure. In this case it may hold that benefits that are paid to unemployed are
lower than wages in the secondary sector, while bw
Y
 is larger than wages in the
secondary sector. We then can generate equilibrium unemployment, even if
unemployed people are relatively poorly matched with high-wage jobs.
9. Substituting the expression for C
t
 into the utility function C.1, we get U
0
=w
j
e-(θ–σg)tdt.
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10. Note that we can neglect flows between traditional-sector employment and
unemployment, because, in equilibrium, there is no incentive to alternate between
equilibrium strategies that have been chosen.
11. From goods-market equilibrium (equation 1), we derive using the production
functions and pricing behaviour of firms in both sectors that
YP
Y
/XP
X
=L
Y
w
Y
(ε-1)/NL
x
ε(1+β)w
T
=(1-σ)/σ.
12. Drawing L
x
 as a function of g in Figure 2 results in a two rectangular hyperbolics of
which one can be excluded since U, g and L
x
 have to be non-negative for an
economically reasonable equilibrium.
13. From equation, 22 it follows that L
x
 unambiguously decreases when benefits increase.
Using goods-market equilibrium (equation1) and the definition for the size of the
high-tech sector (equation 18), we derive that L
T
 and L
Y
 thus decrease. Using labour-
market equilibrium (equation 19) it directly follows that unemployment will increase.
This result straightforwardly follows using Figure 2 in which the TT-locus turns
downwards.
14. On the basis of an extensive sensitivity analysis for reasonable parameter values, we
express confidence in all the qualitative results presented in Table 3.
15. An extensive study with an exclusive focus on the relation between unemployment
and labour market institutions is Nickell (1997).
16. The only variable included in the growth-regression is productivity relative to the
USA at the beginning of the time-period. Inclusion of this variable reduces the
explanatory power of the variables capturing labour market institutions. We refer to
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Levine and Renelt (1992) and Mankiw, Romer and
Weil (1992) for extensive empirical studies regressing growth in a cross-section of
countries on potential explanatory variables like population growth, savings rates,
school enrolment rates, initial income per capita relative to the leader country (the
USA), trade variables like the terms of trade and openness, government consumption
and investment, and institutional variables like political instability, black market
premia, tariff rates and political rights. We refer to Temple (1999) for an excellent
survey of empirical insights on growth performance.
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